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Recent Developments 
Cartnail v. State: 
A Police Officer Was Not Justified, Under Reasonable Suspicion Standard, in 
Conducting an Investigative Traffic Seizure of Defendant Who Had Not Committed 
a Motor Violation 
I n this case, implicating the Fourth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that 
under the reasonable suspicion 
standard, police officers are not 
justified in conducting investigative 
traffic stops, absent specific facts 
and rational inferences based on 
those facts indicating criminal activity. 
Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 753 
A.2d 519 (2000). The court further 
held that a set of wholly innocent 
circumstances cannot add up to an 
articulable suspicion unless they 
establish an objective inference that 
would lead a reasonable and prudent 
officer to make the stop. 
On August 26, 1997, at 
approximately 1:49 a.m., the City 
of Frederick police investigated a 
reported robbery at the Quality Inn 
hotel near the interchange of 
Interstate highways 70 and 270, and 
routes 15 and 340 in Frederick. 
Police received information that 
three black males driving a gold or 
tan Mazda had fled the scene in an 
unknown direction. Based on this 
information, at 3:05 a.m., and 
approximately two miles northeast 
of the Quality Inn, the patrol officer 
pulled over a gold Nissan 
containing two black men, 
Rondorian Wayne Cartnail 
("Cartnail"), the defendant, and 
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another black male. The officer 
requested Cartnail 's driver's license 
and registration, and Cartnail 
voluntarily admitted he was driving on 
a revoked license. The officer 
confirmed the revocation through a 
computer check, and Cartnail was 
subsequently arrested and charged 
based on the information obtained 
pursuant to the traffic stop. 
At a motion to suppress 
hearing, Cartnail moved to suppress 
any statements or information 
obtained after the stop, because he 
had not committed a traffic 
violation, and the officer did not 
have reasonable articulable 
suspicion of any criminal activity. 
The State argued that the robbery 
information supplied the 
articulable suspicion. The motion 
was denied, and the trial court 
subsequently found Cartnail guilty 
of driving with a revoked license. 
The court of special appeals 
affirmed based on the similarity of 
Cartnail 's vehicle and the one 
reported in the robbery, the fact that 
there were multiple occupants in the 
vehicle, and the fact that the stop 
occurred in the early morning hours 
when there are few vehicles on the 
street and in the same metropolitan 
area of the robbery. The court of 
appeals granted certiorari to 
determine whether the police stop was 
lawful. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by addressing the Fourth 
Amendment protections against 
unreasonable searches applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Cartnail v. State, 359 
Md. 272, 279, 753 A.2d 519, 523 
(2000) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 655 (1961)). The 
detention of a motorist pursuant to a 
police traffic stop is a seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment, and is 
evaluated for reasonableness under 
a dual inquiry: ''whether the stop was 
justified at its inception, and whether 
it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place." /d. 
(quoting United States v. Sharpe, 
470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985)(citing 
Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). 
The court of appeals was concerned 
with the first prong and questioned 
whether the officer had reasonable 
articulable suspicion to warrant the 
intrusion. /d. (citing Ferris v. State, 
355 Md. 356, 384, 735 A.2d 491, 
501 (1999)). The court stated that 
"reasonable suspicion . . . is 
dependent upon ... the content of 
information possessed by police 
and its degree of reliability." /d. at 
285-87, 753 A.2d at 526-527 
(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 
U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). Under a 
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"totality of the circumstances" 
standard, both quantity and quality 
of the information must be 
evaluated. !d. at 287, 753 A.2d at 
526-527 (citing Alabama v. White, 
496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). 
The court next considered 
factors in evaluating the totality of 
circumstances. !d. at 289, 753 A.2d 
528. The court found that the 
universe of facts will be determined 
primarily by the amount and 
uniqueness of description, the size 
of the area within which the offender 
might be found, the length of time 
since the offense, and the number 
of people about at the time in that 
area. !d. (citing 4 WAYNE LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9 .4(g) at 19 5, 
198, n. 297 (3d ed. 1996 & 2000 
Supp.)). The court found that the 
details of the robbery suspects used 
by the officer to make the stop did 
not reasonably and articulably match 
Cartnail's circumstances. !d. at 294, 
753 A.2d at 531. 
Finally, the court addressed the 
lack of corroboration between the 
description of the robbery suspects 
and the circumstances surrounding 
Cartnail at the time of the stop. !d. 
at 290, 753 A.2d at 529. The court 
noted the lack of two of the 
reasonable suspicion factors. !d. 
There was no traffic violation, and 
Cartnail was not exhibiting 
behavior out of the ordinary except 
to be on the road in the early 
morning hours when there are few 
others on the road. !d. This was 
analyzed to be "innocent travel" and 
not suspicious activity that would 
justify the stop. !d. The second 
factor lacking was the absence of 
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any knowledge that Cartnail had 
been involved in other unrelated 
criminal activity of a similar nature. 
!d. 
Stating that a driver is entitled 
to privacy at any time of the day, 
the court found that the only factors 
present that matched Cartnail 's 
"circumstances were gender, race 
and arguably the color of the car." 
!d. at 293,296,753 A.2d at 531-
32. The court rejected the State's 
claim that the makes of the vehicles 
involved in the crime, Mazda, and 
Cartnail 's Nissan, sufficiently 
narrowed "the group of innocent 
travelers." !d. at 294, 753 A.2d at 
531. In addition, the court stressed 
the importance of considering the 
elapsed time and distance from the 
stop to the crime. !d. at 295, 753 
A.2d at 532. The court reasoned 
that considering the total picture, 
including the number of major 
highways in the vicinity of the 
crime, the "range of possible flight" 
open to the suspects in the "hour and 
fifteen minutes following the 
robbery [was] relatively enormous" 
including as far as Baltimore or 
Washington, D.C. !d. The court 
determined that a reasonable police 
officer in either ofthose cities could 
not have pulled over Cartnail 
"under such a flimsy guise of 
'reasonable suspicion."' !d. 
The court also considered the 
time of day as an important 
consideration because it decreases 
the number of innocent people on 
the road and can aid the police in 
spotting criminal suspects. !d. at 
296, 753 A.2d 532. However, early 
morning hours also provide police 
more opportunity to observe a 
suspected motorist before initiating 
a Terry stop and that should have 
been done in this case. !d. 
Thus, the court concluded that 
the details and description of the 
robbery suspects "did not 
reasonably and articulably match 
[Cartnail's] circumstances" and 
was an unconstitutional seizure. !d. 
at 297, 753 A.2d at 532. The court 
found that the "combination of 
wholly innocent factors" did not 
combine into a "suspicious" totality 
of circumstances to support the stop 
and reversed the court of special 
appeals, remanding to the Circuit 
Court for Frederick County. !d. at 
294, 753 A.2d at 531 (citing United 
States v. Wood, 106 F. 3d 942, 948 
(10'h Cir. 1997)). 
The court of appeals' ruling 
gives "teeth to the notion ... [that] 
police do not [have] carte blanche 
to pick and choose whom to stop 
based on some 'hunch."' !d. at 297, 
753 A.2d at 532. In determining that 
a combination of"wholly innocent 
factors" is no more suspicious than 
the individual components, the court 
is providing law enforcement 
officials with a clear directive that 
articulably suspicious behavior 
must be present in order to make an 
investigative stop. !d. This 
decision speaks loudly that 
Maryland is aggressively 
preserving the Constitutional rights 
of its citizens, specifically the 
Fourth Amendment right against 
unlawful search and seizures, and 
will not permit random stops based 
on little more than an over 
enthusiastic inclination. 
